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Abstract This paper studies the mechanisms of market discipline in the Mexican
deposit market. It tests the hypothesis that low-quality banks pay higher interest
rates on deposits, receive fewer deposits, and shift their deposit agreements from
long to short term. This hypothesis was assessed with positive evidence in Mexico
during the period 1991–1996, but was not checked again. This research uses a
dynamic panel model and a sample of 37 banks from December 2008 to September
2012 to re-evaluate the market discipline hypothesis. The findings suggest a weak
presence of discipline induced by depositors. Principally, market discipline is absent
within market sectors.
Keywords Market discipline  Deposit market  Bank risk  Mexico
JEL Classification E59  G21  G39
1 Introduction
It is possible that a common depositor cannot interpret indicators about the risky
behavior of his/her bank. Consequently, the bank possesses better information about
its activities and its probability of failure, that is, a moral hazard problem would
exist. It seems that ordinary depositors are not involved with this. Nevertheless,
principally during the last 10 years, academics and the Basel Committee have
proposed disclosing banking information and providing depositors and other
economic agents with better information about bank fundamentals in order to react
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to riskier behavior of banks through market forces (prices and quantities). This is
known as the third pillar of Basel III: market discipline.
Ma´rquez (2011) points out that small depositors are strongly influenced by
marketing, and that they do not take into account bank fundamentals in order to
decide where to allocate their resources. On the contrary, larger depositors,
representing the largest percentage of total deposits, should monitor the risk
taking of their banks. Disclosure of banking information will alleviate informa-
tion asymmetry problems and financially educated agents, who, as we can
expect are the larger depositors, will be able to monitor their banks particularly
well.
The Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model shows withdrawals of deposits as a
response to higher probabilities of bank failure, which can cause bank runs with
strong depressive effects on the economy. Accordingly, government intervention
through deposit insurance schemes is attractive, because it allows better sharing of
risk and prevents bank panic. However, deposit insurance can weaken market
discipline; many empirical studies supporting this undesirable consequence can be
found in the literature (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2004). In addition, other
explicit and implicit policies, such as the too-big-to-fail policy, appear to negatively
affect the monitoring activities of economic agents. As a result, some depositors
believe that their money in a bank account is free of risk, and they simply do not
monitor their banks. In addition, some banks may believe that the monetary
authorities will bail out them, creating incentives for riskier behavior. Therefore,
‘‘where bank runs are explained by bank fundamentals, there is a strong argument
for providing depositors with adequate bank fundamentals’ information’’ (Goday
et al. 2005: 2).
Under these conditions, it is necessary to test the presence of market discipline, to
support disclosure policy, and to verify if the monetary authorities send clear signals
about government involvement in the case of bank failure. This would also remind
depositors and other economic agents that they have an important role in
maintaining a sound banking system.
The market discipline hypothesis has been extensively tested around the world.
The major findings suggest that the depositors discipline their banks by demanding
higher interest rates on deposits from riskier banks or withdrawing their resources.
Thus, this research is motivated by the following question: which mechanisms of
market discipline do Mexican depositors use to regulate the risky behavior of their
banks?
Mexico is an interesting case. Seven banks currently manage around 80 % of
assets and 85 % of deposits, and its banking system was expropriated in 1982 due to
the debt crisis, privatized in 1991 and bailed out in 1997 soon after the so-called
Tequila crisis in 1994 and 1995. Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) found
evidence in favor of the market discipline hypothesis in the deposit market,
especially after the Tequila crisis, even with the deposit insurance scheme. This
hypothesis was not checked again, although Tovar-Garcı´a (2012) also found
evidence of market discipline from the asset side; that is, borrowers discipline their
banks by paying higher interest rates to high-quality banks, but the largest banks and
retail banks are exempt from this discipline. In addition, the subordinated debt is
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considered to be a key instrument in exerting market discipline (Calomiris 1999).
However, only a few Mexican banks issued this kind of obligation. Consequently,
there are reasonable grounds for evaluating once again the presence of market
discipline in the Mexican deposit market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses in brief the
theory of market discipline and presents the major findings of empirical studies for
Latin American countries. Section 3 describes the data sets, a sample of 37 Mexican
banks from December 2008 to September 2012. Section 4 specifies econometric
models (dynamic panel models with the SYS GMM estimator) and it reports and
discusses the results. Finally, conclusions, recommendations, and proposals for
future research are outlined.
2 Brief review of literature
The well-known orthodox theory of supply and demand is behind the market
discipline hypothesis. In banking markets, economic agents should react to the
riskier behavior of their banks, because their costs may present a direct relationship
with bank risk taking. Thus, the riskier behavior of a particular bank will change
depositors’ preferences, and they will shift the supply curve of deposits toward the
left, requiring higher interest rates on deposits or/and withdrawing their resources.
As a result, this particular bank should modify its risk taking. We assume that
depositors can monitor and indentify riskier banks, and they react in consequence.
In other words, market discipline shows two faces: the ability to monitor bank
conditions and the ability to influence banks’ actions, market monitor and market
influence in terms of Flannery (2001).
In the deposit market, it is possible to identify three mechanisms used by
depositors to regulate the risky behavior of their banks. First, the price-based
mechanism: depositors request higher interest rates on deposits as a response to
riskier behavior of their banks. Second, the quantity-based mechanism: depositors
withdraw their funds as a response to risky behavior. In the empirical literature,
these are the most popular mechanisms of market discipline, and also it is possible
to recognize a third mechanism, maturity based, where depositors shift their
resources from long- to short-term deposits due to the riskier behavior of their banks
(Goday et al. 2005; Murata and Hori 2006; Semenova 2007). This gives a warning
about the capability of the depositor to easily withdraw resources as a response to
excessive risk. The baseline model to test these mechanisms can be written as (1):
MECHANISMit ¼ q1Bank  Riskit1 þ X0it1b þ uit ð1Þ
MECHANISM is a measure of the interest rate on deposits (price based), a
measure of the amount of deposits (quantity based), or a measure of time terms
(maturity based). The main explanatory variable is bank risk, usually based on the
five categories of the CAMEL methodology: capital adequacy, asset quality,
management quality, earnings and liquidity. X represents other control variables.
Thus, a significant coefficient of bank risk, with the theoretical expected sign,
indicates the presence of market discipline.
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Table 5, in the appendix, shows empirical studies about market discipline
induced by depositors in Latin American countries. In that table the reader can
easily identify the sample, period of analysis, methodology, main dependent and
independent variables, and major findings. In Latin America, in general, empirical
evidence confirms the presence of market discipline in the deposit market, despite
the existence of deposit insurance. Each empirical study presents particularities, for
example, Ma´rquez (2011) finds that small depositors do not exert discipline in
Colombia. Romera and Tabak (2010) point out that Brazilian depositors consider
that large banks are safer than small banks; therefore, the largest banks do not
experience discipline and the implicit ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ policy is supported by the
government. In Uruguay, Goday et al. (2005) highlight that the quantity mechanism
is more relevant than the price mechanism, which is a common result for emerging
economies, where asymmetric information problems can bias the price mechanism.
In Chile (Bundevich and Franken 2003) and Costa Rica (Mayorga-Martı´nez and
Mun˜oz-Salas 2002), weak evidence was found in favor of the market discipline
hypothesis. Baquero-Latorre (2000) concludes that there is no evidence of market
discipline in Ecuador. In addition, tests on market discipline have been re-evaluated
in Chile, Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay (see Table 5, in the appendix).
In general, and in particular for Latin America, one of the most significant
empirical studies on market discipline was elaborated by Martinez-Peria and
Schmukler (2001), who found evidence of market discipline during the 1980 and
1990s by quantity and price mechanisms in Chile, Argentina and Mexico, even with
deposit insurance, and predominantly in the aftermath of crises. For Mexico, the
regressions included principally 12 of the most important Mexican banks providing:
…evidence that deposits respond to bank risk, particularly in the post-crisis
period. During this period, banks with higher returns on assets, higher capital
over assets, and a higher proportion of personal loans attract more deposits.
Bank risk characteristics are not significant in the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
On the other hand, the evidence suggests that interest rates do respond to bank
risk taking throughout the three periods. A higher proportion of non-
performing loans raises the interest rates paid by banks. A rise in the cash-to-
assets ratio and the capital-to-assets ratio reduce the interest rates charged to
banks. Banks that increase the return on assets and the proportion of personal
loans and real estate loans pay lower interest rates. The F tests indicate that
bank fundamentals are generally jointly significant. (p. 1043).
Historically, the presence of market discipline in the Mexican deposit market was
verified by Luce (2000) and Huybens et al. (2005), who found that bank
fundamentals were a strong determinant of bank withdrawals and acceptability of
bank notes during the years 1900–1910, including the financial crisis of 1907, and in
spite of the regulatory framework with an implicit and limited deposit insurance.
It is interesting to note that the majority of the empirical studies do not test
banks’ reactions, that is, the hypothesis of market influence. Based on Calomiris and
Powell (2000), there are some studies testing whether the interest rate on deposits
reverts to its mean, or whether bank fundamentals are explained by changes in the
amount of deposits or interest rate, as a response of the bank to market discipline
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induced by depositors (Barajas and Steiner 2000; Goday et al. 2005; Galindo et al.
2005). First, endogeneity concerns are evident, and second, in these studies the
banking response may be a result of pressures from regulators, or other market
factors, which cannot be controlled or measured. Accordingly, the tests of market
discipline (tests of market monitor) simply assume that banks will respond to market
forces.
In this context, this paper contributes to the empirical literature in three ways.
First, it tests the third mechanism of market discipline: maturity based, which has
not been tested before in the Mexican deposit market. Second, it analyses groups of
banks by market sector and uses a large diversity of independent variables to check
robustness. Third, it employs panel data in a dynamic model with a SYS GMM
estimator (Blundell and Bond 1998) that has not been utilized before to test
discipline in the Mexican deposit market.
3 Data
The data employed in this research are drawn from the historical statistics of the
National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV), covering the period
December 2008 to September 2012 (quarterly), during the crises in the USA and
Europe. In this period, Mexico had negative GDP growth rates particularly in 2009
and positive rates in 2010–2012.
I analyze 4 years with 16 observations because of data limitations. Baseline data
are incomplete for many key indicators, and this period of analysis presents more
complete statistics, covering 37 banks (Mexico currently has 44 banks in operation,
two were founded in 2012 and information for five investment banks was
unavailable). In addition, I expect that Mexican depositors carefully monitored their
banks during the years of analysis, in accordance with the wake-up call, as proposed
by Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001: 1050), ‘‘traumatic events teach depositors
that they should be concerned about the safety of their deposits at all times’’. It is
important to notice that this period includes limited deposit insurance, and bank
depositors are exposed to the possibility of loss. Nowadays the Bank Savings
Protection Institute, known by its Spanish acronym, IPAB, provides limited
insurance, around 1.9 million Mexican pesos per depositor and bank. On the
contrary, during the years analyzed by Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) the
Fund for the Protection of Bank Savings, known by its acronym, FOBAPROA,
implicitly protected 100 % of deposits.
3.1 Measures of the mechanisms of market discipline
To test the price-based discipline mechanism in the deposit market I use as
dependent variable an implicit interest rate: the ratio of 12-month interest payments
on deposits to the amount of annual average deposits (IIRDE). It is important to
notice that the implicit interest rates have been widely employed in the literature on
market discipline due to data limitations; it is complicated to find data directly
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describing the interest rate on deposits. To evaluate the performance of IIRDE, I
compare it with the 28 days CETES (Mexican Federal Treasury Certificates).
Figure 1 shows the CETES and the average at quarter end of IIRDE. In general,
both rates follow similar trends, but from March 2009 to December 2009 the banks,
on average, paid rates above the reference rate, and from March 2010 to September
2012 paid rates below the CETES. The correlation between CETES and IIRDE
is 0.38. Thus, the Central Bank of Mexico (Banxico) may influence the interest
rate on deposits, but market factors strongly pressure the rates effectively paid by
banks.
It is important to recognize that in the presence of imperfect information the
price-based mechanism might be biased (Park 1995; Park and Peristiani 1998).
Accordingly, the growth rate of deposits (GROWTHDE: depositst/depositslast-quarter)
is used as a dependent variable to test the quantity-based discipline mechanism, that
is, whether low-quality banks receive fewer deposits in comparison with high-
quality banks. This measure is used because absolute amounts can be influenced by
bank characteristics such as size and business orientation.
Furthermore, I explore the third discipline mechanism: maturity based. Do riskier
banks obtain more short-term deposits? Note that depositors can shift from long- to
short-term agreements as a response to riskier behavior of their banks, and this shift
is measured by subtraction: the long-term deposits minus the short-term, both
expressed as a proportion of the total deposits (MATURITYDE). Higher values of
MATURITYDE should reflect high-quality banks. In the Mexican case, in
September 2012 the long-term deposits represented around 40 % of total deposits,
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Quarters: December 2008 - September 2012
Fig. 1 Mexican federal treasury certificates (CETES) and implicit interest rate on deposits (IIRDE)
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3.2 Measures of bank risk or bank fundamentals
The first models testing discipline in the deposit market utilized, as a first step, bank
fundamentals to elaborate a measure of the probability of bank failure, and as a
second step employed that measure as an explanatory variable of the mechanisms of
market discipline. In the literature, bank ratings (Fitch, Moody’s, Standard and
Poor’s, etc.) are popular explanatory variables, too. However, I will not include this
kind of variable due to data limitations. These ratings are available for only a few
Mexican banks (the largest and listed banks). In addition, these ratings show low
variability, and were criticized during the last global financial crisis because they
did not provide accurate information about risk taking.
The latest empirical studies employ directly bank fundamentals to understand
which variables (or types of risk) are influencing market discipline. Accordingly, in
this research the key explanatory variables are approached using the capital
adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings and liquidity (CAMEL)
system.
Capital adequacy is measured by the ratio of capital to total assets (CAPITALR).
For asset quality, I use reserve for loan losses (RESERVE) defined as the balance at
quarter end of provisions for possible credit losses divided by non-performing loans,
and non-performing loans divided by total loans (DOUBTFUL); for management
quality, the ratio 12-month managerial expenses to annual average total assets
(MANAGEMENT1) and the ratio 12-month managerial expenses to 12-month total
income (MANAGEMENT2). Earnings are measured with the 12-month return on
assets (ROA) and the 12-month return on capital (ROE), and for liquidity, I use the
ratio short-term (circulating) assets to total assets (LIQUIDITY1) and the ratio
short-term assets to short-term liabilities (LIQUIDITY2).
In addition, the Z SCORE is used as explanatory variable, defined as the 3-year
average of the 12-month ROA plus the 3-year average ratio of CAPITALR, divided
by the 3-year standard deviation of ROA. This indicator has been extensively
employed in the literature to measure the bank risk of insolvency (Distinguin et al.
2013). A higher Z SCORE value indicates a lower probability of bank failure, that
is, low-risk bank.
Previous empirical studies found that the bank’s size is a relevant explanatory
variable; therefore, this investigation employs the logarithm of total assets (SIZE)
and subsamples to account for the size effect.
Recently, Ben-David et al. (2013) did not find evidence in favor of the market
discipline hypothesis in the USA, and pointed out that deposit rates were
significantly determined by demand-side factors. Banks increase interest rates in
order to attract deposits, particularly when they increase their lending activity.
Consequently, I use the banks’ loan growth (LOAN) as a key control variable.
3.3 Descriptive statistics and subsamples of banks
Summary statistics of the mentioned variables can be seen in Table 1. As Tovar-
Garcı´a (2012), this investigation uses four bank subsamples to take into account
their nature. The first subsample contains seven of the largest banks (G7), which in
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September 2012 attracted around 85 % of total deposits in the banking system. The
second subsample includes 14 commercial banks with typical activities, but smaller
than the G7. The third subsample includes nine retail banks, which specialize in
transactions with consumers. Finally, the fourth subsample contains seven
investment banks, working on the issuance of securities.
On average, the G7 banks are around 30 times larger (by total assets) than the
other types of bank. However, capital ratios (CAPITALR) show that the G7 banks
are below the mean, better than commercial banks, but in a bad position in
comparison with retail banks, which show the highest ratios.
On average, IIRDE (the implicit interest rate) equals 4.2 % and the G7 and
investment banks are below the mean, that is, they paid lower rates on deposits in
comparison with retail and commercial banks, which are above the mean. The
GROWTHDE equals 1.1 and practically all types of bank have similar growth rates,
but the higher standard deviation corresponds to investment banks. MATURITYDE
equals 0.1; it means that, in general, 55 % of deposits correspond to long-term
agreements, and 45 % to short-term. Note that this calculation did not include
information from banks reporting only deposits on short or long term. The G7 and
investment banks particularly attracted deposits on short term, unlike commercial
banks attracted deposits on long term.
On average, ROA and ROE are negative in the case of retail banks. The
indicators of management quality also show that these banks are in the worst
positions, but they are above the mean in indicators about liquidity. The highest
values of ROA and ROE correspond to the G7. Investment banks show a very good
position in the variable LIQUIDITY2 (ratio short-term assets to short-term
liabilities). In addition, they show better values than the rest of banks in the
variables RESERVE and DOUBTFUL, but this result must be treated with caution,
because these variables include information only from two banks.
On average, Z SCORE equals 27.9, the G7 and commercial banks are above the
mean, that is, they are banks less risky, in contrast to retail and investment banks,
which are below the mean, as we can expect due to the nature of their portfolios.
The correlation matrix (see Table 6 in the appendix) shows relevant positive
relationships among total assets, capital and the amount of deposits, in line with
previous findings about the relevance of the largest banks in the deposit market. The
CAMEL indicators show some high correlations among them (unsurprisingly);
therefore, in the regression analysis these variables are included with prudence, to
avoid problems of multicollinearity. In the appendix, Fig. 2 shows means and
general trends of these variables.
4 Empirical models
This research uses regression analysis to test the market discipline hypothesis. Note
that the dependent and independent variables might face problems of endogeneity,
because of measurement error, omitted variables, and reverse causality. Conse-
quently, it is necessary to use instrumental variables, which is a complicated task
due to data limitations. For that reason, previous studies employed lags of
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independent variables as instruments. In addition, the dependent variables are
autoregressive. Under these conditions, a dynamic panel data model is attractive
(Goday et al. 2005), and a first option is the DIF GMM estimator of Arellano and
Bond (1991). However, with small samples, it is recommended to employ the SYS
GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998). This allows for lagged values of the
dependent variable to be entered as regressors and it uses lags of independent
variables in first differences and in levels as instruments correcting endogeneity. It
is assumed that the error term is not serially correlated and Sargan’s overidenti-
fication test validates the instruments.
4.1 Price-based mechanism
The Model (2) tests the price-based mechanism of market discipline. The dependent
variable is the implicit interest rate on deposits (IIRDE), and the key explanatory
variables are lagged by one-quarter to account for the fact that the information is
available to the depositors with a certain delay. In addition, the variables are
transformed in logarithms, consequently the coefficients measure elasticities, and
the model achieves linearity.
LnIIRDEit = LnCAMEL, and ZSCORE
0
it1 b þ c1SIZEit1 þ c2LnLOANit1
þ c3EXPOSUREit1 þ c4CETESt þ BANK0t a þ T 0ts þ uit
ð2Þ
The CAMEL variables are included in the model taking into account collinearity
among them, and with Z SCORE. SIZE is controlling bank size. LnLOAN is the
logarithm of loan growth, controlling the demand effect on interest rates.
EXPOSURE is the ratio of interbank borrowing to total deposits, controlling the
participation of an individual bank in the interbank deposit market, which may work
as a substitute for retail deposits. The reference interest rate CETES controls a
possible influence of the monetary authority on the market, and other systemic risks.
BANK is a dummy variable for each type of bank (G7, Commercial, Retail and
Investment), where the G7 is the reference group, thus the model controls for other
bank characteristics and markets. T is a dummy variable for years controlling effects
of unspecified macroeconomic and financial market conditions, which are assumed
to be constant across banks.
The central hypothesis of interest is that IIRDE is higher for banks showing low-
quality bank fundamentals (higher bank risk). That is, the price paid on deposits
(IIRDE) depends inversely upon the level of CAPITALR, RESERVE, ROA, ROE,
LIQUIDITY1-2, and Z SCORE, and positively upon the level of DOUBTFUL and
MANAGEMENT1-2. This is interpreted as evidence of market discipline in the
deposit market through the price mechanism.
Table 2 summarizes the main results. In columns there are regressions using the
complete sample and subsamples. The explanatory variables in rows and empty
cells indicate that the variable was dropped because of collinearity (read each
regression vertically). The majority of regressions pass the Sargan and the serial
correlation tests. In addition, the dynamic model is justified, particularly for the
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complete sample, the dependent variable as regressor enters with statistically
significant coefficients at the 1 % level, see columns (1–6) in Table 2.
In general, the findings show evidence in favor of the market discipline
hypothesis through the price-based mechanism. Analyzing the results for the
complete sample we can see in Table 2, columns (1–6), that CAPITALR, ROA,
ROE and LIQUIDITY1-2 show evidence in accordance with the main hypothesis,
although they lack robustness (in some regressions their coefficients lost signifi-
cance). Z SCORE enters in the regressions with statistically significant coefficients,
with the expected sign, and robustness. Therefore, depositors react to market forces
taking into account capital adequacy, earnings, and liquidity of their banks. In
addition, depositors monitor the risk of insolvency (Z SCORE). Banks presenting
lower levels in these indicators pay higher interest rates on deposits, and vice versa.
Nevertheless, MANAGEMENT1 significantly enters in the regressions, but with
the opposite to the expected sign, that is, banks with low-quality management pay
lower interest rate on deposits. Moreover, RESERVE and DOUBTFUL show robust
evidence against the market discipline hypothesis; they enter in the model with
statistically significant coefficients and with the contrary expected sign. In other
words, through the price-based mechanism, depositors do not care about the
administrative efficiency and the asset quality of their banks.
The control variables show some interesting results. SIZE presents negative and
significant coefficients; consequently larger banks pay lower interest rates on
deposits (in favor of the implicit ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ policy). LOAN presents some
positive and significant coefficients, that is, there is a demand effect determining
interest rates on deposits, as proposed by Ben-David et al. (2013). EXPOSURE
enters with positive signs and significance; therefore, a higher exposure to the
interbank deposit market corresponds to a higher interest rate on deposits. CETES
presents positive signs and significance, predictably, because of the natural
relationship between IIRDE and CETES (see Fig. 1). The time dummies show
some positive and significant coefficients, surprisingly, because IIRDE shows a
negative trend during the period of analysis (see Fig. 2 in the appendix). Probably,
CETES is catching up with this trend.
The dummy variables for retail and investment banks show significant and
positive coefficients, that is, they pay higher rates in comparison with the G7 banks.
This finding also indicates a bias by subsamples of banks. Accordingly, the
regressions by subsamples are in columns (7–18), in Table 2.
The model lost meaning in the cases of retail and investment banks, columns
(13–18). Many key explanatory variables show coefficients without statistical
significance. This suggests that these banks do not experience market discipline
within their market sectors. The G7 and commercial banks present estimations in
accordance with the findings for the complete sample, but the results lost robustness.
For example, a depositor, comparing only the G7 or commercial banks, does not
take into account the risk of insolvency; Z SCORE is not significant in the case of
the seven largest banks, and for commercial banks Z SCORE presents the opposite
to the expected sign. Bank earnings (ROA and ROE) have significance and the
expected sign for the G7 group. On the contrary, in the subsample of commercial
banks these indicators present the opposite to the expected sign. Consequently, the
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evidence in favor of the market discipline hypothesis through the price mechanism
can be considered weak.
4.2 Quantity-based mechanism
The Model (3) tests the quantity-based mechanism of market discipline. The
dependent variable is the GROWTHDE in logarithms. This model also uses one-
quarter lag and logarithmic transformation of the key explanatory variables.
LnGROWTHDEit ¼ LnCAMEL, and ZSCORE0it1bþ c1SIZEit1 þ c2LnLOANit1
þ c3EXPOSUREit1 þ c4CETESt þ BANK0taþ T 0t sþ uit
ð3Þ
Again, the CAMEL variables are included in the model taking into account
collinearity among them, and with Z SCORE. The control variables have similar
functions to the Model (2). The central hypothesis of interest is that GROWTHDE is
lower for banks with low-quality bank fundamentals. The amount of deposits, that
an individual bank can attract, depends positively upon the level of CAPITALR,
RESERVE, ROA, ROE and LIQUIDITY1-2, and inversely upon the level of
DOUBTFUL and MANAGEMENT1-2. This is interpreted as evidence of market
discipline through the quantity mechanism.
Table 3 summarizes the main results. The majority of reported estimations pass
the Sargan and the serial correlation tests. The dependent variable as regressor
presents negative coefficients, that is, preceding deposit growth rates impact
negatively on future rates.
In the analysis of the complete sample (columns 1–6), the key explanatory
variables present some mixed results. CAPITALR enters in the model with the
expected sign, with statistically significant coefficients, and robustness. RESERVE
and ROE also present the predicted sign and significance, but without robustness,
note that DOUBTFUL is statically significant with the contrary expected sign, and
ROA does not have statistical significance. Subsequently, to regulate the risky
behavior of banks through the quantity mechanism Mexican depositors take into
account capital adequacy.
MANAGEMENT1-2 and LIQUIDITY1-2 enter in the regressions with the
contrary sign and with statistical significance, that is, banks with low efficiency and
liquidity problems can attract more deposits, in opposition to the market discipline
hypothesis. Moreover, the risk of insolvency (Z SCORE) does not have statistical
significance.
The bank size enters in the regressions with some significant and negative
coefficients, that is, larger banks attract fewer deposits (they show lower deposit
growth rates). LOAN enters with positive and significant coefficients, that is, higher
loan growth rates positively influence deposit growth rates. EXPOSURE presents
negative and significant coefficients, because the interbank deposits are substitutes
of retail deposits. CETES has some positive and significant coefficients, that is,
higher prices of the Mexican obligations favor the growth of deposits, the CETES
rate and the interest rate on deposits present a direct relationship. The time dummies
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have negative and significant coefficients, in accordance with the general trend of
GROWTHDE during the period of analysis (see Fig. 2 in the appendix).
The dummy variables for retail and investment banks show some significant and
negative coefficients, that is, they attract fewer deposits in comparison with the
largest banks (G7). Nevertheless, in the case of the subsamples (columns 7–18) the
model practically lost its meaning. The coefficients of the dependent variable as
regressors are not statistically significant. In other words, by groups of banks
(market sectors) the attracted deposits do not depend on previous deposits.
Furthermore, by subsamples, practically nothing is explaining the amount of
attracted deposits; only a few independent variables are statistically significant.
4.3 Maturity-based mechanism
The Model (4) tests the maturity-based mechanism of market discipline. The
dependent variable is the shift from long- to short-term agreements in the deposit
market (MATURITYDE). This analysis excluded banks that attracted only short- or
long-term deposits (see Table 1). Once more, one-quarter lag and logarithmic
transformation of the key explanatory variables are employed.
MATURITYDEit ¼ LnCAMEL, and ZSCORE0it1b þ c1SIZEit1 þ c2LnLOANit1
þ c3EXPOSUREit1 þ c4CETESt þ BANK0ta þ T 0ts þ uit
ð4Þ
The Model (4) also includes the control variables SIZE, LOAN, EXPOSURE,
CETES, BANK, and T, and as in previous cases the CAMEL indicators and
Z SCORE are included with caution because of collinearity. The central hypothesis
of interest is that MATURITYDE is lower (a shift from long- to short-term deposits)
for banks showing low-quality bank fundamentals. MATURITYDE depends
positively upon the level of CAPITALR, RESERVE, ROA, ROE and LIQUID-
ITY1-2 and inversely upon the level of DOUBTFUL and MANAGEMENT1-2.
This is interpreted as evidence of market discipline through the maturity
mechanism.
Table 4 summarizes the main results. In general, the reported estimations pass
the Sargan and the order serial correlation tests, in particular the second order. The
lagged dependent variable as regressor presents positive and significant coefficients
only in the complete sample, that is, the shift to long-term agreements depends
positively on previous long-term agreements.
In the complete sample (columns 1–6), the regressions show weak evidence in
favor of the maturity-based mechanism of market discipline. The indicators of asset
quality (RESERVE and DOUBTFUL) enter in the model with the predicted
sign and statistical significance. In addition, LIQUIDITY1 and 2 have some
significant coefficients with the expected sign, and ROE presents significance and
the expected sign, but without robustness, note that ROA is impacting in the
opposed direction.
CAPITALR and MANAGEMENT2 show evidence against the market discipline
hypothesis, that is, banks with low efficiency and lower capital ratios are able to
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attract more long-term deposits, although this result is not robust, note that
MANAGEMENT1 and CAPITALR are not significant in some regressions.
In addition, the risk of insolvency (Z SCORE) does not have statistical
significance.
SIZE presents some negative and significant coefficients, that is, larger banks
attract fewer long-term deposits. LOAN presents positive and statistical significant
coefficients, that is, loan growth positively influence the shift from short- to long-
term deposits. EXPOSURE has negative and significant coefficients, note that
usually the interbank deposits are short term, and they affect negatively on retail
long-term deposits. CETES presents positive and significant coefficients, that is,
higher CETES rates favor long-term deposits.
Once more, by subsamples, the model lost its meaning; see columns (7–18) in
Table 4. Only commercial banks present some significant coefficients, without
robustness. The subsample of investment banks is included with data limitations,
the sample only includes four banks, and there is no evidence of market
discipline.
Unexpectedly, in the Models (2–4) across subsamples, the majority of
coefficients of the explanatory variables are not statistically significant, and they
are different (probably due to large differences on bank characteristics by bank
groups). This may mean that the regressions using the complete sample with
additive dummies for type of bank are not satisfactory, and we are learning very
little from this exercise. Nevertheless, the models include other control variables
and the results are robust to the inclusion of other explanatory variables. As a
result, the findings suggest the lack of market discipline by market sectors,
principally.
5 Conclusions
The banking literature argues that depositors, through market forces, can discipline
the risky behavior of banks. Riskier banks should pay higher interest rates on
deposits (price-based mechanism of market discipline), and should attract fewer
deposits in comparison with high-quality banks (quantity-based mechanism).
Furthermore, riskier banks should show more short-term deposit agreements than
long-term (maturity-based mechanism), and vice versa.
In general, previous empirical studies for many different countries show
evidence in favor of the market discipline hypothesis. In Mexico, Martinez-Peria
and Schmukler (2001) found evidence of market discipline in the deposit market
during 1990s, principally after the Tequila crisis in 1994 and 1995. This paper
also studied the Mexican case from December 2008 to September 2012, under
the conditions of the global financial crisis originating in the USA and Europe.
With a regression analysis (dynamic panel model) and a large range of
explanatory variables to check robustness, I found weak evidence of market
discipline.
The analysis of the price-based mechanism of market discipline indicates that
banks showing a lower risk of insolvency (higher values of Z SCORE) pay lower
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interest rates on deposits, in accordance with the market discipline hypothesis. In
addition, there are some findings suggesting that banks with good levels of capital,
earnings, and liquidity pay lower interest rates. However, in opposition to the
market discipline hypothesis, banks showing low administrative efficiency (MAN-
AGEMENT1-2) and low asset quality (RESERVE and DOUBTFUL) pay lower
interest rates on deposits.
Through the quantity mechanism, banks with higher capital ratios (CAPITALR)
attract more deposits, as the market discipline hypothesis predicts. However, banks
with low efficiency (MANAGEMENT1-2) and liquidity problems (LIQUIDITY1-2)
can also attract more deposits.
The maturity mechanism shows that banks with high asset quality (RESERVE
and DOUBTFUL) are able to attract more long-term deposits, in favor of the market
discipline hypothesis. On the contrary, there are also some findings suggesting that
banks with low efficiency (MANAGEMENT2) and lower capital ratios (CAPI-
TALR) are able to attract more long-term deposits.
Consequently, considering the complete banking system, mixed results were
found. It seems that Mexican banks face market discipline, and depositors do
not particularly consider managerial skills as relevant proxies of bank risk to
exert market discipline. In addition, the findings suggest that banks can
counterattack market discipline with combinations of price, quantity, and
maturity of deposits. For example, if a bank confronts market discipline by
paying higher interest rates on deposits due to its low capital ratios, this
bank can lessen this discipline attracting more long-term deposits anyway.
Similarly, if a bank pays higher interest rates on deposits due to a high risk of
insolvency, this risk does not influence the quantity of attracted deposits and
their maturity.
Furthermore, in the analysis of bank subsamples (G7, commercial, retail and
investment banks) the models lost meaning, and practically nothing explained
interest rates on deposits, the amount of attracted deposits and their maturities. In
other words, a depositor comparing banks by market sectors is not able to demand
higher interest rates, reduce the amount of deposits, or shift its deposits to short-term
deposits in order to discipline banks.
The findings suggest that banks clearly delimited their markets and within
their own market share market discipline is absent. On the one hand, depositors
take into account some banks fundamentals to decide where, how long, how
much and which price they demand for their deposits. On the other hand, within
market sectors, in reality there are no options, and the banks do not confront
market discipline, probably because of lack of competition. As a result,
policymakers should develop conditions for competition, providing better
information on market conditions to depositors by disclosing information about
key individual bank characteristics, in accordance with the third pillar of Basel
III.
These findings differ from those reported in Martinez-Peria and Schmukler
(2001), where in under a new context the deposit insurance is limited, and as a
result, it should be friendly with market discipline. Nevertheless, note that the
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variable SIZE (the logarithm of total assets) is statistically significant in many cases,
suggesting an implicit ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ policy.
It is possible that depositors lost interest in monitoring banks due to government
intervention, even during crises. It is well known that regulatory discipline (as a
deposit insurance) weakens market discipline. Therefore, policymakers must
develop a regulatory framework where depositors can weigh the risk of their
decisions in the deposit market. In other words, the weak evidence of market
discipline may be a consequence of incorrect signals from the monetary authorities;
likely Mexican bankers and depositors think that the government will take action in
accordance with the implicit ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ policy.
Actually, most of the risks to the stability of the deposit market in Mexico depend
on regulatory discipline. Bureaucrats are responsible for monitoring and controlling
bank risk behavior, and under the pressure of interest groups, corruption and
external shocks, the main task of Mexican policymakers is to restore market
discipline in the deposit market, sending clear signals to the market about
government involvement in the case of bank failure.
It is relevant to note that transaction costs (and other institutional variables) affect
the elasticity of deposits. Larger depositors (with better financial education) may
easily move their deposits, presenting a high elasticity to bank risk, and low
transaction costs. Nevertheless, the regressions show low elasticities, despite the
global financial crisis, and consequently future research is necessary to re-evaluate
the wake-up call proposed by Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) and the effect
of institutional variables as transaction costs.
This study presents data limitations, especially for investment banks. Therefore,
future research for Mexico must attempt to investigate market discipline including
in the sample more investment banks, using data that directly measure the
dependent and explanatory variables, and surveys capturing information from
depositors. In addition, further research is required to examine competition by
groups of banks (G7, commercial, retail and investment banks), because the findings
of this investigation suggest that market discipline is absent principally in market
sectors.
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